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Every year in my 1L Civil Procedure course, I introduce the subject with a
collection of due process cases. The cases force students to confront the tension
between procedural efficiency and fairness right out of the gate. It sets a fantas-
tic tone for a course that is essentially all about managing that tension. What
makes things even more interesting is that the authors of my casebook have
chosen meaty due process cases.1 This is not to say that the re-possession of
one’s stove without notice and a hearing is not important.2 Those cases have
their esteemed place in the doctrine. But, in my experience, students are much
more intrigued by cases like Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,3 Greene v. Lindsey,4 and
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.5
The latter case—Lassiter—is one that really gets students’ attention. The
debate about that case is inevitably a lively one. And, for that, I am so very
grateful. However, every year when I teach it, I find myself rejecting the case
and its approach even more. It is a slow burn—I started out just not agreeing
with its result, but after teaching it a few times, I now simply despise the
entirety of the case. My goal with this Essay is to explain why I have such
distaste for the case, not just to the reader, but also to myself. By exorcising
these demons, as it were, I hope to reach some level of catharsis. Perhaps then I
can teach the case with its pedagogical purpose at the forefront, without my
obvious angst for the case distracting my students.
So first, what is this case about? In short, the case is about the termination
of parental rights and whether, during the hearing to adjudicate one’s parental
rights, an indigent parent should have a state-appointed attorney.6 The second
question is why do I hate it so much? Well, that is a thornier one. There are a
number of reasons to despise this case. It is written without any acknowledg-
ment of race or institutionalized racism, nor does it confront the failings of our
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1 See BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK, TONI MARIE MASSARO, & NORMAN W. SPAULDING,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS (4th ed. 2009).
2 See generally Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The Babcock, Massaro, and Spauld-
ing casebook covers this line of cases quite well in a summary that precedes Lassiter.
3 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Hamdi is also fantastic for upsetting student’s
ideological biases. Many find themselves agreeing with Justice Scalia, a position they might
not have thought possible before entering law school.
4 Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
5 Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
6 Id. at 34.
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criminal justice system. The Court also turns a blind eye to the realities of
poverty. Thus, there are many angles from which one could attack this deci-
sion, as it is a case that finds itself at the intersection of so many “isms.” Yet,
for me, the case is most offensive because it is so sexist. The characterization of
motherhood and its value to our society is not just off-putting, it is plain
irksome.
To understand why the case is so lousy, it is necessary to first know the
case’s background, if only to appreciate the immense amount of bad luck that
Abby Gail Lassiter, the petitioner in the case, experienced. Lassiter was four-
teen years old when she had her first child.7 She was uneducated, poor, and
black.8 Her only support was her mother, Lucille, and the community in which
she lived.9 Lassiter went on to have five children.10 The subject of this case
was her fourth child, William Lassiter.11
When William was eight months old, he was taken from Lassiter by a
social worker named Sam Crawford.12 William had been a sick child, so doc-
tors at his local hospital knew him fairly well.13 When he missed some appoint-
ments, the doctors asked the Durham County Department of Social Services to
follow up with his family.14 Crawford went to Lassiter’s home.15 Lassiter was
not there, but Lucille was caring for the children.16 Crawford said that William
had missed some doctor’s appointments and offered to take him while Lucille
watched the other children.17 Lucille understood that Crawford would bring
William back, but that was not the plan.18
The doctors believed that William was suffering from malnutrition and
other ailments.19 Based on that information, the Department sought to remove
William from the home.20 The first hearing on the removal proceedings was re-
scheduled because Lassiter was in jail for a shoplifting charge—a charge that
was later dropped.21 When the re-scheduled hearing date came, Lassiter still
did not show.22 It is not clear whether she even knew of the date or whether she
knowingly missed the hearing.23 Either way, the judge found that William had
been neglected and gave custody of the child to the state.24
7 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Story of Lassiter: The Importance of Counsel in an Adver-
sary System, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 509 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2nd ed. 2008).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 510.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 517.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 517–18.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 518.
21 Id. & n.35.
22 Id. at 518.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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The removal took place in June 1975, and the state’s records show that
Lassiter only met with William once, in December 1975.25 Why she did not
meet with him in those intervening months is unclear. Why she did not meet
with him after December 1975 is because she was convicted of second degree
murder and sentenced to twenty-five to forty years in prison.26 The story of the
alleged murder of Lassiter’s neighbor and Lassiter’s subsequent trial is a torrid
one. Suffice to say that her ultimate conviction for the murder was dubious at
best.27 Her lawyer was inexperienced and made a number of mistakes.28 More-
over, the state failed to provide potentially exculpatory evidence during the
trial.29
While Lassiter had experienced plenty of hardship up to this point, she
was in for far more. Shortly following her conviction and sentencing, a new
social worker, Bonnie Cramer, came to visit Lassiter in jail to ask that she give
up her parental rights to William.30 Lassiter refused, and instead asked that
William be placed with her mother Lucille and her other four children.31 The
state had no objection to Lucille keeping the remaining four children, which
included a child younger than William.32 But, it refused to let Lucille keep
William.33
Lassiter learned that the Department was seeking termination of her paren-
tal rights in April 1978.34 The hearing regarding this termination occurred in
August that same year.35 Lassiter was present at the hearing, but in the four
months leading up to that hearing, she had done nothing to prepare for it.36
Most notably, she had not requested the aid of an attorney.37 She had informed
a matron at her jail that she wanted some kind of help with the termination
process, but she did not tell the attorney handling her habeas petitions a thing
about the termination proceedings.38 Thus, she came to the hearing alone and
unprepared.39
There were many things that were disturbing about the hearing. The judge
did not believe that Lassiter’s incarceration was an acceptable excuse for her
not finding an attorney for the hearing; thus, he did not give her more time to
find counsel.40 Bonnie Cramer, the social worker, testified against Lassiter, but
had met Lassiter only once.41 In addition, the court allowed Cramer to testify
25 Id.
26 Id. at 520.
27 See id. at 518–21.
28 Id. at 518–19.
29 Id. at 520. This evidence included a confession by her mother, Lucille, that she had killed
the neighbor. Id. at 519–20.
30 Id. at 521.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 521–22.
35 Id. at 522.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 522–23.
41 Id. at 521.
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about the Department’s records even though she had absolutely no personal
knowledge of what was contained in those records.42 The court also allowed
hearsay evidence. And, evidence challenging the Department’s case was
ignored. For example, the Department alleged that Lucille had filed a complaint
against her daughter, asking that she no longer leave her four children with
her.43 Lucille disputed that she had filed any such complaint, yet the court
would not give that testimony any credit.44 These moments in the hearing went
unchallenged largely because Lassiter did not have an attorney to help her
through the process. Ultimately, the court terminated Lassiter’s parental rights
based on a finding that Lassiter “willfully failed to maintain concern or respon-
sibility for the welfare” of William.45
Lassiter’s case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. It presented the
narrow question of whether under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment indigent parents should have a state-appointed attorney in parental
termination hearings. The Court decided that an attorney need not be appointed
in every such case.46 Instead, it determined that courts should apply a case-by-
case analysis using the Mathews v. Eldridge47 balancing test to decide what
due process is required.48 Under Eldridge, a court must weigh the private inter-
ests at stake, the government interests served by the process in question, and
the risk of error under the selected process.49 In Lassiter, the Court found that a
parent’s interest in her child was “commanding” and should be weighed against
the state’s interest in reaching an accurate decision as well as the state’s interest
in executing a hearing process that was not too administratively burdensome.50
Finally, both the parental and state concerns must be weighed against the risk
of error in any given proceedings, which the Court acknowledged could be
quite high depending on the complexity of the hearing itself.51
This all sounds reasonable enough, so why is this case so lousy? Well, I
believe it is a bad case for two substantive reasons. First, the Court erred in its
finding that parental rights were not akin to liberty interests (where an individ-
ual might be incarcerated). This prevented the Court from creating a presump-
tion that indigent parents should receive appointed counsel every time their
parental rights might be terminated.52 Second, even setting the presumption
mistake aside, the Court erred in how it applied the Mathews v. Eldridge bal-
ancing test to Lassiter’s case. There were many reasons why the Court reached
42 Id. at 523.
43 Id. at 527.
44 Id. at 527, 532.
45 Id. at 532.
46 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
47 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
48 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31–32.
49 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35.
50 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27–28, 31.
51 Id. at 31. For example, if the hearing involved medical evidence or other complex mat-
ters, an unrepresented parent might be confused.
52 At the time of Lassiter’s argument before the Court, thirty-four states and the District of
Columbia had statutes that provided appointed counsel to indigent parents in parental termi-
nation hearings. See Brief for the Petitioner at 17, Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S.
18 (1981) (No. 79-6423), available at http://legal1.cit.cornell.edu/kevin/civprostories/chap
14/lassiter01.pdf.
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these flawed results, but sexism is the one that I will address. Thus, while there
are many principled ways to criticize this case, I will do so through the lens of
sexist attitudes toward women.
First, the Court completely rejected the idea that the loss of parental rights
might be equal to or greater than the loss of one’s personal liberty in the crimi-
nal context.53 The Court did not explain much of its reasoning in this case, but
pointed to its precedent cases. Those cases basically held that an indigent’s
right to appointed counsel “has been recognized to exist only where the litigant
may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.”54 Yet, the Court had
recognized that parental rights were “far more precious . . . than property
rights” in other contexts.55 Thus, there was nothing to prevent the Court from
expanding its conception of what rights might require appointed counsel.
In fact, the Court had already broadened the loss of personal liberty to
include cases involving a transfer from prison to a mental institution,56 a sen-
tence in a juvenile proceeding,57 and a six-month prison sentence.58 In all of
those instances, the Court determined that the indigent person was due
appointed counsel. It does not seem like a giant leap to say that losing one’s
child is just as fundamental an interest as losing one’s liberty, especially when
that loss of liberty spans only six months. In fact, one could easily argue that
the two instances are not even comparable. Most parents would probably agree
that losing one’s right to her child seems like a far greater loss than spending
six months in prison. As Lassiter’s attorney argued before the Court, “The par-
ent has a compelling interest of preventing a denial of her right to care, custody,
and companionship to her child. She has the compelling interest of maintaining
the right to transfer cultural or religious and political views to the next genera-
tion.”59 In other words, the parent’s interest in her parental rights could be
viewed as more compelling than her right to physical liberty. Yet, the Court
refused to take this approach.
The question is why. The argument expressly articulated in the opinion
and at oral argument is the old stand-by—the slippery slope. It goes something
like this: If you start expanding this concept beyond loss of personal liberty,
then what’s next? During oral argument, one justice wondered what might hap-
pen if a particular profession required a state license and the state denied the
license application for a hypothetical man.60 Assuming that man was indigent,
would he have the right to counsel if he challenged that determination? In other
words, if the presumption of counsel were expanded from loss of personal lib-
53 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
54 Id.
55 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
56 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (four justices agreed that counsel should be
appointed in such a situation while a fifth concurring judge argued that, in some cases, a
layperson might provide the right assistance).
57 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
58 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
59 Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18
(1981) (No. 79-6423).
60 Id. at 11–12.
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erty to loss of parenting rights, then why not also expand it to something as
important as what the justice referred to as the loss of his “livelihood.”61
This is a traditional slippery slope argument, and it has some appeal. The
Court was obviously concerned about moving the presumption of appointed
counsel from its limited place in the criminal context to the unlimited civil one.
But, there are elements of this argument that also reveal the Court’s bias against
women. In the moment described above where the justice asked about the pro-
fessional license, he revealed his belief that the male stereotypical role of
breadwinner was at least, if not more, important than the stereotypical role of
mother as care-taker. When Lassiter’s attorney challenged that belief, the jus-
tice responded, “Well, here’s a man about to lose his livelihood. He may no
longer practice his profession. Isn’t that a rather significant interest?”62 In
essence, the justice asserted that if parenting—a role that he associated with
women—was considered a fundamental right worthy of appointed counsel in
this context, then certainly employment—a role that he associated with men—
must be similarly fundamental. Yet, as the justice knew, the Court’s precedent
would not support a reading of the Constitution that would presumptively
expand appointed counsel to a situation where the indigent person’s property
(employment) was at stake. Thus, by juxtaposing these two stereotypical
roles—mother as care-taker and father as breadwinner—the Court set up the
argument that if something as important as one’s “livelihood” was not captured,
then certainly something less important like parenting could not be.
Of course, this is a deplorable view of parenting. First, many fathers, both
then and now, are engaged parents and many mothers, both then and now, are
both parent and breadwinner. Yet, the gender stereotypes of parenting roles
persist. It was this dismissive view of mothering that, in part, prevented the
Court from elevating the loss of parental rights highly enough to create a pre-
sumption of appointed counsel. So while the slippery slope argument had some
appeal, it also masked the Court’s bias toward women. Or, put differently, it
masked the Court’s bias against “mothering,”63 and thus, against women.
Similarly, as to the second error—how it applied the Eldridge test to
Lassiter’s case—the Court further revealed its bias toward women. After
degrading parenting because of the perception that if women were doing most
of it, it could not be as important as a “real” man’s job, the Court turned around
and held Lassiter to an impossible standard of motherhood. By idealizing what
a “good” mother might do and then comparing Lassiter to it, the Court showed
its limited and unrealistic view of how mothers should behave.
In applying the Eldridge test, the Court first determined that a parent’s
interest in her status was “extremely important” and that the state’s interests
61 Id. at 12.
62 Id.
63 I use the term mothering instead of parenting because the Court focused on parenting by a
woman. And, to a greater degree, I use that term because of what I believe was the Court’s
view of parenting—the oft-held perception that it is the province of the woman to care-take
for her family while the man will provide the means for living. There is plenty of scholarship
challenging this notion of parenting and gender roles, see, e.g., Darren Rosenblum, Unsex
Mothering, Toward a New Culture of Parenting, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 57 (2012), but
once again, the stereotypes undeniably persist and abound.
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were strong, but not as commanding.64 Thus, the case turned on application of
the risk of error part of the Eldridge balancing test. The Court argued that the
risk of error was low to non-existent.65 First, there were no criminal charges
associated with this hearing, so she was not at risk of physical detention (ignor-
ing for the moment that she was already incarcerated).66 Also, there was no
expert evidence and the points of law were not “specially troublesome.”67
Finally, and most importantly, the Court determined that even with assistance
of counsel, Lassiter could not have overcome the “evidence that she had few
sparks of . . . interest” in William.68 This allowed the Court to dismiss any
concerns it might have over the inability of Lassiter to present a meaningful
defense, including her inability to dispute hearsay evidence that the Court
acknowledged had been erroneously admitted.69
The Court completely failed to acknowledge the complexity of Lassiter’s
experience as a mother of five children, her poverty, her skin color, and the
effect that all of those factors had on her ability to mother in a stereotypical, if
not traditional, white privileged way. Instead, it applied a standard of idealized
motherhood—one that would have allowed her to show up in a fancy dress to
protest the taking of her child immediately after it occurred. One that would
have made her skin color white.70 One that would have allowed her to properly
articulate that she wished to remain as William’s parent, and that if she could
not, she wished him to be placed with his loving grandmother. This articulation
needed to be stated in terms that the justices could understand, terms that only
June Cleaver might have been able to provide.71
Yet, if the Court was listening, this mother was speaking out in an effort to
keep her child in her nuclear family. She stated during the hearing that “[h]e
knows us. Children know they family . . . . They know they people, they know
they family and that child knows us anywhere. . . . I got four more other chil-
dren . . . and they know they little brother when they see him.”72 She further
explained that William still recognized her and his siblings by telling a heart-
wrenching story about seeing William out with his foster mother.73 She stated
that William “got out of [the shopping] cart” because he saw his mother and his
siblings and “he didn’t want to go with [his foster mother].”74 Finally, after
repeated questioning by the attorney in the termination hearing, Lassiter asked
64 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
65 Id. at 32.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 32–33.
69 Id.
70 See Adrien Katherine Wing & Laura Weselmann, Transcending Traditional Notions of
Mothering: The Need for Critical Race Feminist Praxis, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 257
(1999). In this article, the authors argue that “[a]lthough each of us has our own idea of what
it means to mother, the law constructs its own image of the ideal mother. The law rewards
the self-sacrificing, nurturing, married, white, solvent, stay-at-home, monogamous, hetero-
sexual, female mother.” Id. at 258.
71 June Cleaver was the famous “perfect” mother on the hit television show Leave it to
Beaver.
72 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
73 Thornburg, supra note 7, at 529.
74 Id.
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him, “Sir, how would you feel if somebody came and got your child and took it
away like that.”75
That final question went unanswered, yet, it is very telling. Lassiter was
not a perfect mother, but let’s face it, no mother is. She had her infirmities, but
to say that she did not care for or have a “spark” of interest in her child was an
unfair assessment. Her pleas, those that would appeal to the emotional connec-
tion that individuals have with their children, simply did not resonate with
those who sat in judgment of her. Unfortunately and instead, the civil justice
system that she confronted from the time of her termination hearing to the time
her case was argued before the Supreme Court could not get over its idealistic
view of mothering. For instance, in the oral argument, the attorney for the
Department repeatedly questioned why Lassiter had not done more to attempt
to retain an attorney or to see her child, even though she was in prison.76 He
stated that “the fact that a parent is in prison does not prevent them from main-
taining concern or responsibility as to the child’s welfare. And she . . . made no
effort to do that.”77
The Department attorney’s statement is superficially true, but certainly
one can appreciate that Lassiter’s experience was more nuanced than simply
failing to inquire about her child. There was evidence in the record that she
asked the matron at the prison for legal help. The fact that she did not ask her
habeas attorney for help is easily explained away by her inability to understand
all of the proceedings against her. It did not necessarily evidence a lack of
interest in her child. There was also ample evidence in the record that she had
been told different things about William by the Department, and that when she
was incarcerated, she was clear and consistent in her request that William
remain with her mother Lucille.78 Moreover, although there was some evidence
to the contrary, Lucille was clear during the termination hearing that she was
more than willing to care for William and to bring him home to his four sib-
lings while his mother served her prison term.79 In other words, there was evi-
dence that Lassiter was a decent mother, and more importantly, that she cared
for William’s well-being and wanted him to remain with his family. Yet, all of
that evidence, and all of her and her mother’s admonitions, could not overcome
the fact that she was a poor, absent, convicted murderer, and thus, could not be
a good mother.80
It was the Court’s unwillingness to let go of its idealistic expectations of
motherhood that prevented it from seeing that, in fact, the risk of error in
Lassiter’s case was quite high. There are undeniable rules, both spoken and
unspoken, about how mothers are to conduct themselves, and these rules deter-
75 Id.
76 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 49, at 31, 37.
77 Id. at 37.
78 Thornburg, supra note 7, at 528–29, 532.
79 Id. at 530–31.
80 The dissent points out, albeit indirectly, the sexist underpinnings of this decision. It noted
that “I deem it not a little ironic that the Court on this very day grants, on due process
grounds, an indigent putative father’s claim for state-paid blood grouping tests in the interest
of according him meaningful opportunity to disprove his paternity.” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 58 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
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mine how mothers are received by society.81 In this case, Lassiter did not come
close to meeting the requirements of being a good mother; thus, it was much
easier for the Court to dispense with any concern about whether she continued
her motherhood. While an attorney could have made a difference in the termi-
nation hearing, the Court would not concede that point because it really did not
matter to it. Lassiter’s mothering did not measure up. Because of that short-
sightedness, Lassiter and her family suffered the unspeakable harm of losing a
child.
Perhaps I am so affected by this case because in addition to being a law
professor, I am a mother. So, I also feel the pressure of idealized notions of
motherhood, and maybe it is that insecurity that brings out my strong response
to this case. That the sexist overtones in this case are cloaked under a concern
for the distinction between the process required in civil and criminal cases is
even more insulting. This case is quite simply an example of how the civil
justice system does not work for so many. As a person who benefits from white
privilege, I cannot say that I understand how it must feel to have the system
work against you in this way. But, with Lassiter the person, I can absolutely
share my womanhood, my motherhood, and my continuing disgust at how she
and her family were treated. So, at the end of the day, this Essay may serve as
some kind of catharsis for me because I know more clearly why I am bothered
by the case. However, even after writing this Essay, I doubt I will stop expres-
sing my distaste for the case to my students—pedagogical concerns and dis-
tractions aside. And ultimately, as a professor, mother, and woman, I think that
is as it should be.82
81 Carol Sanger, M Is for the Many Things, 1 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN’S STUD. 15, 17–18
(1992). Sanger writes, “The rules [of motherhood] remind women of how to behave in order
to stay revered. This reverence is something more than a fan club for mothers. It matters in
such practical and concrete ways as keeping one’s children, having credibility in court, get-
ting promoted at work, and so on.” Id. at 18.
82 Doing what the Supreme Court was unwilling to do, forty-three states and the District of
Columbia now provide an indigent parent with appointed counsel, if requested, in a termina-
tion hearing. See Thornburg, supra note 7, at 542.
